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This advisory letter is a response to the House of Representatives’ request to the Advisory 
Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) for advice on ‘the aspirations for 
independence by the Kurdish Autonomous Region of Iraq in the light of the Montevideo 
criteria.’0F1 
The CAVV has divided this request for advice into a number of sub-topics:  
A. the substance and role of the Montevideo criteria;  
B. the role of the right of self-determination and the legality of a possible unilateral 
secession; 
C. the role and legal implications of recognition by other states.  
 
This advisory letter addresses each of these sub-topics in turn, in the light of the situation in 
the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR). The content of this advisory letter was drafted by 
CAVV members Dr. C.M. Brölmann, Dr G.R. den Dekker, Professor L.J. van den Herik, Dr A. de 
Hoogh and Professor J.G. Lammers. It was adopted by the CAVV on 18 April 2018. 
This advisory letter is intended to identify the legal standards and principles that are relevant 
to these topics and to use them to outline the applicable legal framework. It is important to 
note that the three topics cited above to a certain extent constitute three distinct legal 
discourses, which do not always dovetail perfectly with one another. Nevertheless, together 
they constitute the legal framework within which political considerations and choices must be 
made, for instance in relation to the KAR. With regard to those political choices: the CAVV’s 
aim is not to establish whether the Kurds are a ‘people’ with the right of self-determination; 
whether the KAR should be permitted to, or indeed must be able to, become an independent 
state; whether the Kurdish Region includes the ‘disputed territories’; whether it ought to or 
must include parts of Iran and Turkey as well; whether effective control is exercised over the 
KAR and, if so, by whom. Reaching an opinion on these points involves in part considerations 
of a non-legal nature, and in this respect the CAVV aims to exercise restraint.  
In a similar vein, sooner or later, aspiration for independence by a group that is distributed 
over the territories of multiple states (like the Kurdish population, spread over Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey and Syria) may have implications for territorial integrity and for respect for existing 
international borders. The question of whether political stability in the region and 
international affairs would ultimately benefit from any major changes, or would actually be 
better served by maintaining the status quo, is not one that can be answered purely on the 
basis of international law. 
  
                                                          





It should also be noted for the record that where this advisory letter refers to ‘legality’, this 
means legality under international law, not under any country’s domestic law, unless stated 
otherwise.  
 
With respect to the facts, the CAVV has based its advisory letter inter alia on the summary 
given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence in their letter to 
parliament of 24 October 2017.1F2  
 
A few facts should be recalled at the outset: on 25 September 2017 a referendum on Kurdish 
independence was held in the Kurdish Autonomous Region and parts of the disputed 
territories that are under Kurdish control, including Kirkuk and the province of Nineveh. The 
question on the ballot paper was: ‘Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas 
outside the region's administration to become an independent state?’2F3. Kurdistan’s electoral 
commission announced that turnout was approximately 78 per cent and that 93 per cent of 
the votes cast were in favour of an independent Kurdistan.  
The referendum was called by the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan and the aim was to secure a 
mandate for further negotiations with the Iraqi government. The referendum was not binding 
under constitutional law because it was ‘held without the approval of the Iraqi government, 
which branded both the referendum and its result as unconstitutional, among other reasons 
based on a judgment of the Supreme Court’.3F4 At the time of writing (April 2018) the Kurdish 




2. MONTEVIDEO CRITERIA AND OTHER CONDITIONS  
 
According to the traditional doctrine, a ‘state’ exists under international law if the conditions 
set out in article 1 of the 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,4F5 better known 
as the Montevideo Convention, are fulfilled:  
- a permanent population;  
- a defined territory;  
- government;  
- the capacity to enter into relations with the other states.  
 
                                                          
2 Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives (2017-2018) 32 623, no. 178. 
3 Translation by CAVV. 
4 Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives (2017-2018) 32 623, no. 178 as cited above, p. 2 [translation 
CAVV]. 





These are objective criteria, but need not be fulfilled in an absolute sense: a border dispute 
need not impair statehood, nor should a nomadic (and therefore not entirely permanent) 
population. Neither does a state cease to exist if the government (temporarily) loses control 
over part of the territory. With respect to territory, there must be a defined claim and the 
population must be more or less clearly identified. With respect to ‘government’, it is 
important to determine whether it is effective (see below).5F6 In addition it is generally 
considered important that the ‘government’ will be able to maintain its position in future. The 
fourth characteristic refers to whether an entity has the legal capacity, rather than de facto 
capacity, to enter into international relations (see the section on recognition below). For 
instance, it could be argued that Scotland currently fulfils the first three criteria set out in the 
Montevideo Convention, but because it is still part of the United Kingdom it does not have the 
capacity to enter into international relations independently.  
A further general comment should also be made regarding the Montevideo criteria. These 
criteria were laid down in 1933 to delineate the scope of the Montevideo Convention. The aim 
of these criteria, which are now generally taken to be part of customary international law, is 
to determine whether an entity is already an independent state, not whether a developing 
entity is capable of becoming a state. These origins explain why the criteria can be difficult to 
apply in the present day, particularly if the fourth characteristic is set as a ‘condition’ for 
aspiring states that are currently developing; there is a certain degree of circularity involved 
here, since – quite apart from the issue of the political willingness of third states to enter into 
diplomatic relations or treaties with a new entity (see section 4 on recognition) – international 
law does not in principle attribute the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations and treaties 
until a state exists as such. It can therefore be concluded that the fourth characteristic 
(‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’) does not function as an independent 
element in the way that the first three criteria do in relation to the creation of states, but 
rather in the identification of an existing state.  
Finally, it should be noted that if a territory, such as the KAR, has characteristics that fulfil the 
Montevideo criteria, this does not automatically mean that the region is an independent state. 
There also has to be an intention to be an independent state. In this respect, the course 
adopted by the Dutch government at an earlier stage6F7 – i.e. that no assessment of whether or 
not the Montevideo criteria are fulfilled needs to be made unless a declaration of 
independence is issued – is correct.  
Furthermore, an actual declaration of independence would only be the starting point of a 
process, and would need to be followed up by a number of further steps. For example, it may 
be expected that a declaration of independence would be underpinned by attempts by the 
‘new’ authorities to extricate themselves from the de jure and de facto control of the central 
                                                          
6 See A. Nollkaemper, Kern van het Internationaal Publiekrecht (The Essence of Public International Law) (7th 
ed. Boom, 2016), Rn 84; W. Werner, ‘De Staat’ (The State), in N. Horbach, R. Lefeber and O. Ribbelink (eds.), 
Handboek Internationaal Recht (Handbook on International Law) (Asser, 2007), p. 165.  





authorities; in other words, a declaration would be followed by the adoption of a constitution 
for the new entity, refusal to continue to accept the control of the central authorities and an 
attempt to obtain control over the territory. An existing state is not obliged to accept a 
declaration of independence by a section of its population in part of its territory and – within 
the boundaries of the law – (see section 3) can and may take measures to preserve the 
territorial integrity of the state.7F8 The question of whether a new state has (at any point) come 
into existence leads back to the Montevideo criteria. An important factor in identifying the 
characteristics of a state is whether the ‘central’ authorities are able to maintain or restore 
control or whether they have actually lost control; it is also required that the control of the 
‘new’ authorities is effective, which implies ‘stability’ (often this can be established only after 
a certain amount of time has passed). When forming an opinion on this point, one important 
consideration will be the extent to which the population of the ‘newly’ declared state supports 
its independence.  
Over the past few decades a new condition for the lawful creation of states has emerged in 
international law doctrine, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo,8F9 namely that the process by which a state is created must not 
be accompanied by violations of fundamental principles of international law, in particular of 
peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). Specific examples include mass or gross 
human rights violations or the unlawful use of force. An aspiring new state will not have been 
lawfully created in such cases. Such violations would pre-empt the formation of a new state 
and as a result other states would be obliged to withhold their recognition (see section 4).  
In principle, an infringement of the territorial integrity of an existing state does not constitute 
such a serious violation of international law. This means that unilateral secession, i.e. 
secession without the agreement of the central state government, is not necessary illegal 
under international law (see also section 3). In its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo the ICJ also 
adhered to a restrictive interpretation of the principle of ‘territorial integrity’ as being 
confined to the sphere of relations between states – which implies that the principle cannot 
by definition be violated by non-state actors (such as peoples who aspire to form a state).9F10 
                                                          
8 See the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 1970 (UN Doc. 2625 (XXV)), which states in respect 
of the right of self-determination that ‘[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States …’ 
9 Accordance With International Law Of The Unilateral Declaration Of Independence In Respect Of Kosovo, ICJ 
Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010. See paragraph 81 of the advisory opinion: ‘…the illegality attached to the 
declarations of independence thus stemmed […] from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected 
with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular 
those of a peremptory character (jus cogens).’ 





However reasonable criticism has been levelled against this interpretation, which some regard 
as too narrow.10F11  
3. SELF-DETERMINATION AND UNILATERAL SECESSION 
 
Besides the Montevideo criteria, the doctrine of self-determination is also relevant to the 
situation of the KAR. All peoples have the right of self-determination, which in a general sense 
entails the free pursuit of their ‘economic, social and cultural development’.11F12 Under 
international law, the term ‘people’ is defined using largely factual criteria, some of them 
objective (for instance ethnicity, tradition, language) and some subjective (self-identification 
as a community).12F13 It is therefore possible that within a state’s borders there can be a ‘people’ 
that does not encompass its entire population. The fact that a population group within a 
particular state has ties with population groups in other states – as for instance the Kurds in 
Iraq have ties with Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iran – does not as such detract from the 
possibility for a group within a particular state to identify itself as a ‘people’ in a sense relevant 
to international law.  
 
It follows from the foregoing that ‘the KAR’ as such is not the entity to which the right of self-
determination may apply – this right accrues to peoples.  
 
Under current international law, the right of self-determination is in principle exercised within 
the borders of existing states: the right of ‘internal self-determination’ is therefore the rule.13F14 
Only in exceptional circumstances can a right of ‘external self-determination’ arise and at that 
point lawfully override the territorial integrity of the state. Such a right to secession exists in 
the situation of colonisation14F15 or foreign subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a 
colonial context.15F16  
                                                          
11 See for example S.F. van den Driest, ‘From Kosovo to Crimea and Beyond: On Territorial Integrity, Unilateral 
Secession and Legal Neutrality in International Law’, 22 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 2015, 
467. 
12 See the identically worded article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 1 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966; see also the preamble to the United 
Nations Charter. 
13 There is no legal definition of the concept of ‘people’. An authoritative unofficial definition is as follows: a 
people is a group of persons with a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, 
linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity, territorial connection, or a common economic life with the will 
to be identified as a people and the consciousness of being a people (‘Kirby definition’, International Meeting 
of Experts on further study of the concept of the rights of peoples: Final Report and Recommendations, UNESCO 
doc. SHS-89/CONF.602/7, pp. 7-8. (1998)).  
14 Article 1 of both of the 1966 Covenants. See also Supreme Court of Canada in para. 126 of Reference re 
Secession of Quebec (1998): ‘…a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development 
within the framework of an existing state’; in a similar vein, see the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in the Katanga decision (1994); see also ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (‘The Wall’), Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 88 and 118. 
15 See Resolution 1541 of the [United Nations] General Assembly (15 December 1960). 






It is also sometimes argued that if a people’s right of self-determination within the borders of 
the state is denied to it, external self-determination gives rise to a positive right of secession, 
which is sometimes categorised as ‘remedial secession’.16F17 This is a disputed category17F18 due to 
divergences in legal opinion and in practice.18F19 Under international law as it currently stands, 
there does not appear to be general support for the existence of a right of secession outside 
the context of colonisation or occupation.19F20 
In this connection it should be noted that – for example – the Netherlands, with respect to the 
recognition of Kosovo in 2008, actually raised this third category of remedial secession and 
also cited an alternative basis for it: ‘such a secession is permitted if (a) there has been a 
prolonged and gross violation of the right of internal self-determination and all possible 
options for effectuating the right of self-determination within the international borders of the 
state have been exhausted, or (b) there have been gross and widespread violations of 
fundamental human rights.’20F21 At the same time the Netherlands observed that ‘[…]Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence must be seen as a sui generis case that does not create a 
precedent. There is also international agreement on this point.’21F22 
International law as it currently stands therefore acknowledges three categories of unilateral 
secession: the first is illegal secession, which is accompanied by a serious violation of 
international law (as is generally accepted to have occurred with respect to Northern Cyprus 
and the Crimea); this violation (see section 2) acts as a legal barrier to what would otherwise 
amount to the creation of a state on the basis of factual criteria. The second category is 
unilateral secession based on a positive right of a people in the context of the right of self-
determination (as in the many examples of decolonisation from the 1960s until the 1980s). 
There is also a third, broad category of situations in which no right of secession exists, but 
where secession (or an attempt at secession) also is not illegal under international law.22F23 For 
this reason the ICJ ruled in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo that there is no rule of international 
law that prohibits a declaration of independence.  
                                                          
17 External self-determination is cited, conditionally, as a remedy of last resort for a violation by the state of the 
right of internal self-determination in paragraph 134 of the Quebec reference, but referred to more categorically 
in paragraph 138. 
18 See also Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, paragraph 82. 
19 S.F. van den Driest, ‘Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and 
(Remedial) Secession in International Law’, 62 Netherlands International Law Review (2015) 329. 
20 S.F. van den Driest, Remedial Secession: A right to external self-determination as a remedy to serious 
injustices, Antwerp: Intersentia 2013.  
21 Letter to parliament on the recognition of Kosovo (Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2007-2008, 
29479, no. 8); see also the Written Statement of the Kingdom of The Netherlands submitted in the Kosovo case 
(17 April 2009). In paragraph 82 of the Advisory Opinion as cited above (see footnote 17), the Court observed 
that the states taking part in the proceedings had expressed radically different positions on this point.  
22 Letter to parliament on the recognition of Kosovo (Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2007-2008, 
29479, no. 8). 
23 See S.F. van den Driest, ‘From Kosovo to Crimea and Beyond: On Territorial Integrity, Unilateral Secession 
and Legal Neutrality in International Law’, 22 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 2015, 467; 






Whether or not a unilateral secession by the KAR could be lawful would ultimately depend on 
how the facts were framed and assessed in the context of the doctrines set out above. In the 
context of the aspiration for internal self-determination, it can be noted as a matter of fact 
that the Iraqi constitution of 2005 sets out the contours of an autonomy arrangement for the 
KAR.  
 
Finally, if it is accepted that a right of remedial secession exists in the broad sense, i.e. in 
response to both human rights violations and the denial of internal self-determination, then 
the question would arise as to whether the situation in the KAR attains the threshold of 
sufficiently serious human rights violations or of obstruction of internal self-determination.  
 
4. RECOGNITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES  
 
The third doctrine relevant to this request for advice is that of recognition. In international 
relations this pertains to the recognition of states and not of governments, since it is the state 
that has legal personality under public international law. This does not detract from the fact 
that states can demonstrate their ‘recognition’ of the legitimacy of the governments of other 
states in the conduct of diplomatic relations. However, in 1990 the Netherlands explicitly 
adopted the position that ‘we recognise states, not governments’.23F24  
As noted above, in relation to the KAR we are not at the stage of the ‘Montevideo criteria’ and 
the subsequent question of recognition. However, since it is possible that a unilateral 
declaration of independence could be issued by the KAR at any time, it would be wise to 
consider what ‘recognition of a state’ entails from an international law perspective.  
Recognition concerns the acceptance of the new state by other states. It may be implicit or 
explicit. With respect to the role played by recognition, it is generally considered that the 
‘constitutive theory’ (under which a state does not come into existence until it has been 
recognised by other states) does not apply or no longer applies; instead the ‘declaratory 
theory’ (under which recognition as such is not a condition for a state to be created and to 
exist as an international legal person) is generally accepted. 
It follows that recognition by other states is not one of the objective criteria for statehood (see 
section 2) and therefore not a condition for the creation of a state. Recognition of a territory 
as a state does not in principle have any legal consequences under international law; from a 
legal perspective it is a purely declaratory act. 
                                                          
24 See the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the House of Representatives, Parliamentary 





This also implies that from a legal perspective the KAR becoming an independent state should 
not be confused with the KAR being recognised as an independent state: recognition of the 
KAR as a state would not have any impact on the legal status of the territory of the KAR.  
In certain circumstances recognition is nonetheless legally – and, in particular, practically – 
relevant. For instance, if there are doubts about the objective characteristics of an aspiring 
state, recognition can serve as a form of supplementary ‘evidence’ for determining whether 
an entity does indeed fulfil the criteria laid down by international law. The most important 
factor to consider is that a state that has not been recognised (or widely recognised) will in 
practice be unable to perform juristic acts under international law. Recognition, or the 
absence of recognition, can therefore have major implications for the concrete manifestation 
of a state. One well known example is Somaliland: it fulfils the Montevideo criteria without 
difficulty, but is in fact invisible on the international stage. The considerations involved in 
recognising the KAR must therefore be weighed up in this light.  
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that some scholars have argued that there 
should be a general international law obligation to recognise states that fulfil certain objective 
criteria. However, no such rule of international law has come into existence. It also cannot be 
concluded that not supporting a people (as opposed to obstructing a people) in its lawful 
exercise of the right of self-determination – external self-determination, where necessary – 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act. Conversely, recognising a state that comes into 
existence in violation of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) does amount to 
an internationally wrongful act; in that case there is an obligation of non-recognition.24F25 In such 
a case recognition, like recognition at a point when the Montevideo criteria are not or have 
not yet been fulfilled (sometimes referred to as ‘premature recognition’), can be regarded as 








                                                          
25 See art. 41(2) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: ‘No State shall 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40 [CAVV: peremptory 
norms of general international law, i.e. jus cogens], nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.’ 







- At present no declaration of independence has been issued by the KAR. Even if a 
territory does in certain respects fulfil the ‘Montevideo criteria’, it does not become 
an independent state automatically (i.e. without the legal intention to this effect).  
 
If a declaration of independence were to be issued at any point in the future, the following set 
of international law principles would apply:  
- Over the past decades there has been broad agreement that the creation of a state 
may not be accompanied by violations of fundamental rules of international law, in 
particular jus cogens;  
- A declaration of independence is not as such contrary to international law (Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo, ICJ). In order words, provided that it is not accompanied by 
violations of fundamental rules of international law or jus cogens, an attempt at 
secession is not contrary to international law.  
- The only possible basis under international law for a unilateral secession from Iraq by 
the KAR (i.e. secession without the consent of the central authorities) would be the 
exercise of the right of self-determination by the Kurdish population in Iraq. Under 
international law as it stands, a people can only exercise its right of self-determination 
‘internally’, i.e. within the borders of an existing state, except in cases of colonisation 
or foreign occupation. The existence of a right of unilateral secession outside these 
circumstances (‘remedial secession’) is disputed.  
- The prevailing ‘declaratory theory’ holds that recognition by other states is not a 
constitutive requirement for the creation of a state. However, it is a matter of fact that 
a state will be unable to function effectively in its external relations and will therefore 
be obstructed in its concrete manifestation if recognition is entirely lacking.  
- There is no international law obligation to recognise an entity as a state if it fulfils the 
Montevideo criteria, even if the population can be regarded as a people that is lawfully 
exercising its right of self-determination.  
- If the creation of a new state is accompanied by violations of jus cogens, there is an 
obligation of non-recognition (article 41(2) of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts). 
 
  
